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Beyond the Prohibition Debate:  Thoughts on 
Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State 
Reforms 
Alex Kreit* 
Nearly forty years after President Richard Nixon first 
declared a “war on drugs”—calling drugs the “modern curse of 
the youth, just like the plagues and epidemics of former years”1—
it seems the war may finally be coming to an end.  In his first 
interview after being confirmed as the Director of the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske told the Wall 
Street Journal that he thought it was time to retire the war 
rhetoric when it comes to addressing drug abuse.2  At the state 
level, the past year has seen proposals to legalize marijuana 
introduced in a handful of states with polls showing 
approximately forty-five percent of Americans nationwide in 
support of the idea.3  Importantly, these recent developments 
follow nearly a decade and a half of successful drug reform 
measures at the state level on issues ranging from medical 
marijuana, treatment instead of incarceration, asset forfeiture, 
and marijuana decriminalization.  In short, the argument that 
we should end the war on drugs in favor of a new approach no 
longer resides in the world of the politically unthinkable, and has 
quickly become a subject of serious policy and political 
discussion. 
This article considers how we might think about federal drug 
laws in a post-drug war context, particularly one in which states 
are increasingly passing laws that are at-odds with federal law.  I 
argue that, when it comes to federal drug law, traditional debates 
about prohibition, legalization, or decriminalization turn out to 
* Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas 
Jefferson School of Law.  I would like to thank the editors of the Chapman Law Review 
for organizing such an engaging symposium along with my fellow participants in this 
symposium.  I am particularly grateful to my co-panelists Hector Berrellez, James Gray, 
Asa Hutchinson and moderator James Rogan for their thoughts and comments. 
1 DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF 
FAILURE 11–12 (1997). 
2 Gary Fields, White House Czar Calls for End to ‘War on Drugs,’ WALL ST. J., May 
14, 2009, at A3. 
3 Dave Ferrell, Weed Takes Root: Marijuana’s Steady Creep Toward Legalization 
Nationwide, S.F. WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 2010, at 14, 17. 
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be surprisingly unimportant.  Instead, as states begin to enact 
new policies, the key question facing federal lawmakers and 
administration officials will be how to harmonize federal law 
with state reforms. 
My argument proceeds in four Parts.  Part I provides a brief 
overview of the mounting evidence that the war on drugs 
strategy has proven to be an extremely costly and largely 
ineffective method for dealing with the problem of drug abuse.  
Further, this section also looks at how dissatisfaction with the 
current approach has led to increased interest in decriminalizing 
or legalizing marijuana, even at the federal level.  In Part II, I 
argue that the focus on debates over legalization or 
decriminalization at the federal level is misplaced.  This is 
because, even if it wanted to, the federal government would not 
have the ability to unilaterally “legalize” or “decriminalize” any 
controlled substances.  Using the example of medical marijuana 
laws as a case study, Part III contends that, just as the federal 
government does not have the ability to unilaterally 
decriminalize a drug, it also does not have the power to stop 
states from reforming their own laws.  In Part IV, I consider the 
implications of Parts II and III and conclude that they counsel in 
favor of reforming federal drug laws in a way that would respect 
states’ decisions to innovate in the area of drug policy, while also 
providing important controls and incentives to prevent against 
negative externalities in the form of spillover effects in 
neighboring states. 
I.  THE EMERGING CONSENSUS FOR REFORM 
The central principle of the drug war strategy has been that 
vigorous enforcement of increasingly strict criminal laws, though 
expensive, is necessary to reduce drug abuse and related 
problems.4  This philosophy has had a dramatic effect on our 
criminal justice system.  In 2008, 12.2 percent of all arrests in 
the United States were for drug offenses—more than any other 
category of offense5—and 82.3 percent of all drug arrests were for 
simple possession.6  Meanwhile, nearly one quarter of the 
2.3 million Americans behind bars today are there for drug-
related offenses.7  Indeed, the number of Americans incarcerated 
4 This Part of my article draws heavily from my article Toward a Public Health 
Approach to Drug Policy, 3 ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE GROUPS 43, 43–47 (2009). 
5 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2008, ARRESTS 
(2009). 
6 Id. 
7 Kreit, supra note 4, at 43. 
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for drug offenses today is larger than the entire United States 
prison and jail population was in 1980.8 
Maintaining this effort has been quite costly to taxpayers.  
The annual price tag of our drug policies is notoriously difficult to 
measure, due in large part to the various agencies at the federal, 
state, and local levels that are involved.9  As a result, 
measurements vary.  But, while the specific figure is open to 
debate, there is no doubt that the number is in the tens of 
billions each year.  In one of the more recent and prominent drug 
war cost-estimates, for example, Harvard economist Jeffrey 
Miron reported that net annual expenditures, across all levels of 
government, is approximately $44 billion after subtracting drug 
law-related revenue from fines and asset forfeitures.10 
Despite all of this, however, our policies appear to have had 
little impact on drug abuse.  Drug war proponents often cite 
temporary reductions in use within particular time periods or 
drug categories, yet as each apparent success has given way to 
another drug epidemic—from heroin in the 1970s, to crack in the 
1980s, to methamphetamine in recent years—it has become 
increasingly clear that our policies have had, at most, a negligible 
impact on abuse and overall use.  The drug war’s inability to 
achieve its stated goal of reducing the overall use of illegal drugs 
along with the continued occurrence of new drug epidemics are 
due, at least in part, to the substitution effect: “[I]f enforcement 
increases the price of an illicit drug, consumers often can shift to 
alternative illegal substances or to new products that have not 
yet been declared illegal.”11  In short, while the use of certain 
drugs have decreased over the life of the drug war, the overall 
effort to reduce drug use and abuse through law enforcement has 
not succeeded.  Indeed, as vocal drug war supporter Joseph 
Califano observes in his book High Society, the “number of 
Americans twelve and older who use[d] illicit drugs more than 
doubled” between 1992 and 2005.12  Gil Kerlikowske recently 
8 Id. 
9 Erik Luna, The Big Picture, Drug Détente, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 304, 305 (2008) 
(“Frankly, however, calculating the aggregate expense of prohibition may be an 
impossible task, given the myriad areas of spending and the disinterest of drug warriors 
in revealing the actual cost of their crusade.”). 
10 JEFFREY A. MIRON, THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG PROHIBITION 2 
(2008), available at http://leap.cc/dia/miron-economic-report.pdf. 
11 David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under 
Federalism, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 692–93 (2003). 
12 JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., HIGH SOCIETY: HOW SUBSTANCE ABUSE RAVAGES 
AMERICA AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2007). 
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summarized the drug war strategy by acknowledging: “In the 
grand scheme, it has not been successful.”13 
Perhaps the starkest evidence that our current strategy has 
failed came in the first comparison of drug use rates across 
countries, which was undertaken by the World Health 
Organization.  The World Health Organization concluded that 
despite having the most punitive policies, the United States had 
the highest rates of illegal drug use of the seventeen countries 
included in the study.14  Among the report’s findings: The 
number of Americans who have used cocaine is approximately 
four times higher, at 16.2 percent, than any other country.15  And 
more than twice as many Americans have tried marijuana than 
residents of the Netherlands, where the drug is openly bought 
and sold in regulated shops.  That gap is even wider among 
adolescents fifteen years and younger, with just under three 
times as many American teens (twenty percent) having tried the 
drug than their contemporaries in the Netherlands (seven 
percent).16 
The World Health Organization’s findings present a 
particularly difficult challenge to those who support our current 
approach to drug policy.  This is because, even if we were to 
assume that the war on drugs has reduced overall substance use 
and abuse—a questionable premise—the lower usage rates in 
other countries indicate that we could almost surely be achieving 
the same or better results at significantly reduced economic and 
human costs. 
Indeed, even when we look at the impact on drug supply, the 
drug war appears to have been relatively ineffective.  While few 
would dispute that prohibition increases the price of illegal drugs 
above what they would be in a legal and regulated market, most 
illegal drugs remain relatively affordable.  Moreover, prices for 
some drugs have actually decreased over the past three decades, 
even as we have undertaken costly and environmentally 
questionable efforts, such as crop eradication programs.  A 2008 
Brookings report on U.S.-Latin American relations found that 
13  Martha Mendoza, US Drug War Has Met None of Its Goals, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 13, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iLZNYd6C9SGpa 
2oeiZIqT-HKVrCQD9FMCM103. 
14 Louisa Degenhardt et al., Toward a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis 
and Cocaine Use: Findings from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 5 PLOS MED. 
1053, 1057 Table 2, 1062 (2008) [hereinafter WHO Survey], available at 
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/archive/15491676/5/7/pdf/10.1371_journal.pmed.0050141-
L.pdf (concluding that the United States “stands out with higher levels of [drug] 
use . . . despite punitive illegal drug policies”). 
15 Id. at 1057. 
16 Id. at 1057–59. 
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“the street prices of cocaine and heroin fell steadily and 
dramatically” between 1980 and 2007, and that “cocaine 
production in the Andean region is currently at historic highs.”17 
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the overwhelming 
public support for ever-more punitive drug policies during the 
1980s and early 1990s has disappeared and we now see 
substantial majorities in favor of reform measures.18  According 
to a 2008 Zogby poll, three quarters of Americans say that they 
believe the “war on drugs” policy is failing.19  Similarly, voters 
have generally embraced proposals to move state and local drug 
policies away from the drug war strategy.20  Since California 
voters passed the first modern state medical marijuana law in 
1996, thirteen other states have followed suit.21  Most recently, 
proposals to decriminalize or legalize marijuana have begun to 
attract an especially great deal of attention.  In 2008, 
Massachusetts voters approved a ballot initiative to 
decriminalize the drug with sixty-five percent in favor.22  And, 
within the past year, legislation and ballot initiatives to legalize 
marijuana have been proposed in California, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, and Washington, with legislators in Rhode 
Island establishing a panel to study the issue.23  In California, 
where the issue will come before voters in a ballot initiative this 
fall, recent polling has shown that fifty-six percent of residents 
are in support of taxing and regulating marijuana like alcohol.24 
17 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, RETHINKING U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS: A 
HEMISPHERIC PARTNERSHIP FOR A TURBULENT WORLD, 25–26 (2008). 
18 The past decade has also seen an emerging consensus among policy analysts 
and some foreign leaders that the war on drugs has proven to be less effective than lower-
cost and more humane policies adopted by other countries. See Kreit, supra note 4, at 45–
47. 
19 ZOGBY INT’L, LIKELY VOTERS 9/23/08 THRU 9/25/08, 43–45 (2008) 
http://www.zogby.com/news/X-IAD.pdf. 
20 For an overview of the first decade of state drug policy reform efforts, see 
Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 828–37 (2004) 
(discussing drug reform ballot initiatives in the areas of medical marijuana, mandatory 
treatment, forfeiture reform and marijuana decriminalization). 
21 Gardiner Harris, Researchers Find Study of Medical Marijuana Discouraged, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, at A18 (reporting that New Jersey became the fourteenth state 
to enact a medical marijuana law).  See also MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-
STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: HOW TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF ARREST (2008), 
available at http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/SBSR_NOV2008_1.pdf 
(providing an overview of state medical marijuana laws). 
22  Kreit, supra note 4, at 44. 
23  Ian Geronimo, Effort to Get Legalization Measure on Ballot Grows, DAILY 
EMERALD, May 13, 2010, http://www.dailyemerald.com/effort-to-get-legalization-measure-
on-ballot-grows-1.1479730. 
24 Wyatt Buchanan, Pot Initiative: 700,000 Signatures Gathered, S.F. CHRON., 
Jan. 29, 2010, at C1 (reporting that backers of a marijuana legalization ballot initiative 
had gathered the necessary signatures to place the issue before the voters and that a 
Field Poll had found fifty-six percent of Californians in favor of the idea). 
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II.  REFORMING FEDERAL DRUG LAWS:  THE IMPORTANCE OF 
ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 
As this brief overview reveals, after forty years, it is difficult 
to describe the war on drugs strategy as anything other than a 
failure.  Our effort appears to have had little, if any, sustained 
success at reducing drug use or abuse.  More importantly, to the 
extent drug war policies may have had an impact on the use of 
illegal drugs, the experiences of European countries give us every 
reason to believe that we could have achieved the same or better 
results at a substantially reduced cost.  As a result, there is now 
a strong consensus among voters that the war on drugs strategy 
has failed.  We have also begun to see substantial support for 
particular reforms, including some ideas that were viewed as 
politically unimaginable just a decade ago. 
However, as proposals to alter our drug laws have entered 
the political spotlight, there has been relatively little attention 
paid to the different roles of the federal government and the 
states in the area of drug policy.  This oversight is not new.  
Indeed, as Michael O’Hear observes in his authoritative article 
Federalism and Drug Control, the question of how drug 
enforcement and policy-making decisions should be distributed 
between state and federal authorities has been surprisingly 
under-examined for quite some time.25  The changing political 
landscape in this area, however, reveals even more clearly why 
this question is such an important one.  When state and federal 
efforts are closely aligned in the pursuit of the same strategy, as 
they were for some time during the war on drugs, policy 
discussions will naturally tend to revolve around the best tactics 
for implementing the strategy, or about the wisdom of the 
strategy as a general matter.  Perhaps it is not surprising, then, 
that drug policy questions are typically viewed through the same 
lens, regardless of whether the context is state or federal law.  
While this tendency may make sense when state and federal 
strategies are closely aligned, it becomes problematic when the 
two diverge.   
The example of marijuana law reform, which has started to 
gain some attention at the federal level, is instructive.  In 2008, 
and again in 2009, Congressman Barney Frank introduced bills 
to “decriminalize” marijuana, saying that the government should 
allow people to “make their own choices as long as they are not 
25 O’Hear, supra note 20, at 785–87. 
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impinging on the rights, freedom or property of others[.]”26  And, 
when President Barack Obama held an online town-hall meeting 
to answer questions submitted and voted on by voters through a 
White House website, reformers worked to help push a question 
about marijuana legalization to the top of the list.  President 
Obama offered only a brief response to the question that 
garnered the most votes, joking, “I don’t know what this says 
about the online audience,” before dismissing the idea.27  
Meanwhile, when faced with questions about proposals to tax 
and regulate marijuana like alcohol, President Obama’s “drug 
czar” Gil Kerlikowske has taken to saying that “[l]egalization 
isn’t in the President’s vocabulary, and it certainly isn’t in 
mine.”28 
Kerlikowske’s “vocabulary” line has been a source of 
frustration among marijuana legalization advocates and has 
been viewed as a sign that the administration is not willing to 
engage the question with a serious response, even if it were to 
ultimately remain opposed to the idea.  The criticism is certainly 
understandable.  After all, President Obama gave serious and 
substantive responses to all of the other questions he received in 
his online town hall meeting, but only a one-sentence humor-
based reply to the question about marijuana policy.29 
In an important sense, however, the debate about legalizing 
or decriminalizing marijuana truly is misplaced in the context of 
federal drug laws.  Indeed, to ask if the federal government 
should legalize marijuana is to ask an essentially irrelevant 
question—irrelevant not because it is unimportant or on the 
political fringe (certainly, if the polling is to be believed, it is not), 
but because it misunderstands the role of the federal law in 
shaping drug policy.  Whether or not legalizing or decriminal-
izing marijuana is a good idea, the federal government simply 
does not have the power to effect such a change. 
Imagine, for example, that every federal elected official 
decided tomorrow that marijuana should be taxed and regulated 
like alcohol.  Even if they were to pass legislation that removed 
all federal criminal penalties for possessing, manufacturing, or 
26 Bob Egelko, Lee Backs Bill to Ease Pot Laws, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 2008, at B2 
(reporting that Frank’s bill was “the first marijuana decriminalization measure 
introduced in Congress since 1978”). 
27 Michael A. Fletcher & Jose Antonio Vargas, The White House, Open for 
Questions, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2009, at A2. 
28 Donna Leinwand, New Drug Czar Ready to Corral Forces; Putting Focus on 
Abuse of Prescriptions, USA TODAY, May 21, 2009, at A3. 
29  See Aaron Houston, Laws Subsidizing Mexican Drug Gangs Are No Laughing 
Matter, S.F. CHRON., March 31, 2009, at A18 (criticizing President Obama for failing to 
take marijuana policy seriously). 
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selling marijuana, the drug would still be illegal everywhere in 
the country because all fifty states have their own laws 
criminalizing the sale of marijuana.30  To be sure, if the federal 
government were to remove criminal penalties for the cultivation 
and distribution of marijuana, it would have a substantial impact 
on the enforcement of marijuana laws in the United States.  That 
impact, however, would not be “legalization” of the drug 
inasmuch as marijuana would not be legal to buy and sell in any 
state unless and until that state also changed its laws.  In short, 
unless the federal government decided to preempt state law,31 it 
could not unilaterally “legalize” a controlled substance even if it 
wanted to. 
To see why this point has important implications for 
thinking about federal drug laws, consider Congressman Frank’s 
proposed legislation.  Congressman Frank and the media framed 
the bill, dubbed the “Act to Remove Federal Penalties for 
Personal Use of Marijuana by Responsible Adults,” as a proposal 
to decriminalize marijuana nationwide.32  But, if we think a bit 
more about what the bill would actually do, we find that the 
question of whether or not our country should decriminalize 
marijuana is not particularly relevant to assessing the merits of 
Congressman Frank’s proposal. 
The Personal Use of Marijuana by Responsible Adults Act 
would enact a simple change in federal law by eliminating 
federal penalties for “the possession of marijuana for personal 
use,” defined as 100 grams or less of marijuana, “or for the not-
for-profit transfer between adults of marijuana for personal 
use.”33  How would this change in the law impact marijuana 
enforcement in the United States?  A quick look at the data for 
30 Though some states have decriminalized possession of personal-use amounts of 
marijuana, no state has made the sale or cultivation of marijuana legal other than for 
medicinal purposes. See Robert MacCoun et al., Do Citizens Know Whether Their State 
Has Decriminalized Marijuana? Assessing the Perceptual Component of Deterrence 
Theory, 5 REV. OF LAW & ECON. 347, 351–53 (2009) (listing states that have considered 
decriminalizing marijuana). 
31 The likelihood of this happening is, not surprisingly, virtually zero.  Indeed, the 
federal government has not even sought to preempt state medical marijuana laws despite 
fervent efforts to stop their implementation and almost certainly could not, even if it 
wanted to. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.  Cf. also, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 
589, 603 (1977) (noting that “the State no doubt could prohibit entirely the use of 
particular Schedule II drugs,” which are legal under federal law). 
32 See David Knowles, Barney Frank and Ron Paul Team Up to Decriminalize 
Marijuana, POLITICS DAILY, Jul. 15, 2009, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/07/15/ 
barney-frank-and-ron-paul-team-up-to-decriminalize-marijuana.  Although the Act has 
been called by other names, its official name is the Personal Use of Marijuana by 
Responsible Adults Act of 2009. H.R. 2943 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).  For purposes of 
consistency, I will refer to it by its official name. 
33 H.R. 2943, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
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federal prosecutions reveals that the actual effect of the 
legislation would be quite minimal.  In 2008 there were a total of 
only 626 simple marijuana possession cases disposed of in federal 
court.34  To put this number in perspective, there were 
approximately 754,223 arrests for marijuana possession 
nationwide in 2008.35  In other words, the bill would impact 
about 0.0008 percent of all individuals arrested for marijuana 
possession. 
It is also worth noting that the 626 figure is almost certainly 
larger than the number of individuals who would have been 
charged with a federal crime based on simple possession of a 
personal use amount of marijuana alone.  This is because, in all 
likelihood, a number of the 626 defendants were initially charged 
with a more severe offense but were convicted of marijuana 
possession as part of a plea deal.36  Indeed, of the 370 defendants 
convicted of federal marijuana possession in 2008, 367 were 
based on guilty pleas.37  And, though data is not available on the 
number of individuals who were federally charged based on the 
not-for-profit transfer of personal use amounts of marijuana, 
there is no reason to believe that it is significantly larger than 
the number of individuals charged with simple possession. 
With this in mind, to say that the Personal Use of Marijuana 
by Responsible Adults Act would have a negligible impact on 
marijuana arrests and prosecutions would be an understatement, 
particularly when one considers that individuals who might 
avoid federal prosecution under the legislation would not 
necessarily escape punishment, as they could still be prosecuted 
at the state level.  Far from “decriminalizing” marijuana, then, 
the direct impact of Congressman Frank’s proposal would be to 
remove a few hundred defendants from the federal system and 
leave their cases to local prosecutors.  Indeed, even if the 
proposal were expanded beyond marijuana to take the federal 
government out of the business of prosecuting simple possession 
34 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, DEFENDANTS DISPOSED 
OF IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS BY OFFENSE AND TYPE OF DISPOSITION, FISCAL YEAR 2008 
TABLE 5.24.2008 (2009), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242008.pdf [hereinafter 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS].  See also, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of 
Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal 
Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1464–65 (2009) (describing the comparatively minimal role 
federal law enforcement plays in the enforcement of marijuana laws). 
35 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2008 
ARRESTS & TABLE 29 (2009), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/arrests/index.html. 
36 See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHO’S REALLY IN PRISON FOR 
MARIJUANA? 23 (2005) (arguing that plea bargaining “can distort the statistics on 
marijuana possession offenders, consequently leading some people to claim that our 
prisons are overflowing with pot smokers”). 
37 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 34. 
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for all drugs, the real-world effect would still be surprisingly 
trivial, as there were only 394 prosecutions for simple possession 
for all drugs other than marijuana in 2008.38 
When viewed in this light, it becomes clear that to discuss a 
proposal like the Personal Use of Marijuana by Responsible 
Adults Act primarily by reference to terms like decriminalization 
and prohibition is really to misstate the relevant issue.  A debate 
over whether to remove federal penalties for small amounts of 
marijuana or other drugs is not a debate about decriminalization, 
but about the best use of federal resources and the most sensible 
role for federal law in addressing the problem of drug abuse.  In 
other words, the policy question posed by Congressman Frank’s 
bill is not whether to criminalize possession of small amounts of 
marijuana, but rather who is best able to enforce criminal laws 
against possession of small amounts of marijuana, and whether 
the activity is one that the federal government can or should 
concern itself with. 
Not only would reframing the debate over federal drug laws 
on these terms be more accurate, it may also make it easier to 
bridge the divide between different sides of the debate on drug 
policy issues and find common ground.  For example, even those 
who are opposed to the idea of decriminalizing drugs as a general 
matter may nevertheless believe that it is unwise to have a 
federal law that is so infrequently enforced.  As has been 
observed in other contexts, rarely enforced laws can become 
problematic on that basis alone because they are especially 
susceptible to being applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary 
fashion.39  The potential for arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement may be all the stronger in an area like drug 
possession, where the overwhelming majority of defendants will 
find themselves in state court while an unlucky few may face 
more severe penalties for the same conduct in federal court.40  
Meanwhile, others who oppose decriminalization may 
nonetheless believe that the federal government should not 
criminalize activity that can be (and already is) much more 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, 
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 73 (2004) (arguing in the context of laws 
against sodomy that rarely enforced statutes “are a recipe for unpredictable and 
discriminatory enforcement . . . [and] do violence to both democratic values and the rule of 
law”). 
40 See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 786, 788–91 (E.D. Mo. 1994) 
(discussing the role of prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of federal crack cocaine 
laws); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 643, 668–75 (1997) (arguing that the federalization of crimes over which states 
also have authority results in disparate treatment because defendants fare worse when 
prosecuted in federal court than in state court). 
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efficiently dealt with by the states because doing so detracts from 
federal efforts to police more complex interstate crimes.41  State 
governments are much better equipped than the federal 
government to investigate and prosecute local, street-level crimes 
such as drug possession.  Perhaps, then, federal law enforcement 
resources should be reserved for crimes that are more difficult for 
state officials to detect.42 
Whatever one’s view about the appropriate role of federal 
law in drug enforcement, recognizing that a proposal to remove 
simple drug possession from federal authority is only 
tangentially related to the idea of “drug decriminalization” is 
critical if we want to achieve a more rational and constructive 
dialogue about federal drug laws.  So long as every structural 
change in federal drug laws is viewed within the framework of 
the debate about prohibition or legalization, there will be little 
room for agreement and compromise.  Likewise, questions that 
are much more relevant in the context of today’s drug policy 
landscape—in which states are enacting and considering a 
diverse range of different reforms—like how to most effectively 
use state and federal law enforcement resources, or which policy 
decisions should be left to state discretion and which require 
uniformity across the country, will continue to be pushed to the 
background. 
III.  LEARNING FROM THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO STATE MEDICAL 
MARIJUANA LAWS 
A. Why the Federal Government Has Been Unable to Block 
State Medical Marijuana Laws 
The case for moving beyond the legalization debate when 
thinking about federal drug laws becomes even stronger when we 
consider the sort of changes to state drug laws that we are most 
likely to see over the coming five to ten years.  Among the most 
prominent and viable state reforms that appear to be on the 
horizon are the continued enactment of state medical marijuana 
laws and the probability that one or more states will legalize 
marijuana for recreational purposes.  As discussed above, since 
41 Cf. e.g., Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm than Good: Assessing 
Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 469 (1994) (arguing that 
“federalization [of criminal law] dilutes the resources of federal law enforcement 
agencies . . . as federal prosecutors devote their time and resources to local crimes”). 
42 Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[I]f I 
were a California legislator I would not have supported the Compassionate Use Act.  But 
whatever the wisdom of California's experiment with medical marijuana, the federalism 
principles that have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that room for experiment 
be protected in this case.”). 
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1996, fourteen states have legalized the use and, in some 
instances, distribution of marijuana for medicinal purposes.  
Similar proposals have already been introduced in the 
legislatures of other states43 and, unless there is a sudden 
reversal in public opinion on the issue, it is very likely we will 
continue to see more states enacting medical marijuana laws.  
Moreover, with proposals to tax and regulate marijuana like 
alcohol, and polls showing support for doing so at above fifty 
percent in parts of the country, a number of political observers 
believe we may see marijuana legalized for recreational use in 
one or more states within the near future.44 
As in the case of the Congressman Frank’s Personal Use of 
Marijuana by Responsible Adults Act, we find that the debate 
over prohibition and legalization is only tangentially relevant to 
how federal law should address these proposed state reforms.  A 
review of the federal response to state medical marijuana laws is 
particularly useful to help see why this is so. 
Perhaps the most significant, though largely 
underappreciated, lesson to be learned from fourteen years of 
state medical marijuana laws is that the ability of the federal 
government to override or interfere with state drug laws is 
actually quite limited.  As Robert A. Mikos persuasively argues 
in his insightful article, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical 
Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal 
Crime, “states [have] retain[ed] both de jure and de facto power 
to exempt medical marijuana from criminal sanctions, in spite of 
Congress’ uncompromising—and clearly constitutional—ban on 
the drug.”45  In other words, just as the federal government does 
not have the power unilaterally to legalize or decriminalize a 
controlled substance, it also appears unable to prevent states 
from doing so. 
Not long after California voters enacted Proposition 215—
also known as the Compassionate Use Act (CUA)—the federal 
43 See, e.g., Matthew Clark, State Rep. Introduces Medical Marijuana Bill, 
MORNINGSUN.NET, Feb. 5, 2010, http://www.morningsun.net/news/kansas/x1431749203/ 
State-Rep-introduces-medical-marijuana-bill (reporting on a proposal to legalize medical 
marijuana in Kansas). 
44 See Nate Silver, Americans Growing Kinder to Bud, FiveThirtyEight.com, 
Feb. 22, 2009, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/02/americans-growing-kinder-to-
bud.html (discussing polling trends on the issue of marijuana legalization).  I should 
emphasize, of course, that it is far from certain that these reforms will occur.  Predicting 
political shifts is always a tricky endeavor; indeed, the sudden surge in public opinion 
support for marijuana legalization has itself taken many political observers by surprise.  
But guesses at what the future may hold are a necessary part of thinking about the issues 
that federal officials are most likely to be confronted with in the area of drug enforcement 
in the coming years. 
45 Mikos, supra note 34, at 1423. 
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government began a vigorous effort to effectively block 
implementation of the law.  The federal effort targeted both 
physicians who recommended medical marijuana to their 
patients and dispensaries that sought to cultivate and distribute 
the medicine.46  Just months after passage of the CUA, then-drug 
czar Barry McCaffrey announced that the administration would 
seek to revoke the DEA registrations of physicians who 
recommended medical marijuana to their patients, thereby 
leaving them unable to prescribe other controlled substances.47  
The strategy was a smart one: because the ability to prescribe 
medication is necessary for a doctor to effectively practice 
medicine, the odds were that very few physicians would do 
anything that would put their DEA registration at risk.48  In a 
lawsuit by a group of California doctors and patients, however, 
the Ninth Circuit found that the DEA’s plan was 
unconstitutional as an infringement on physicians’ First 
Amendment rights because it restricted a physician’s ability to 
speak “frankly and openly” with their patients49 and 
discriminated based on the viewpoint of physicians’ speech.50  
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit enjoined the federal government 
“from either revoking a physician’s license to prescribe controlled 
substances or conducting an investigation of a physician that 
might lead to such revocation, where the basis for the 
government’s action is solely the physician’s professional 
‘recommendation’ of the use of medical marijuana.”51  The ruling 
effectively closed the door on the federal government’s least 
expensive and most promising method for shutting down 
California’s medical marijuana law. 
With its effort to target physicians thwarted, the federal 
government was left to focus on enforcement efforts against those 
involved in the medical marijuana market as the only potentially 
viable avenue for disrupting state medical marijuana laws.  As 
judged by the results of court rulings, the government was far 
46 See id. at 1465–69 (describing the federal effort to block implementation of 
Proposition 215); Alex Kreit, Comment, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the 
States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1797–1800 (2003) (same). 
47 See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California 
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) (stating that the “DEA will seek 
to revoke the DEA registrations of physicians who recommend or prescribe Schedule I 
controlled substances”). 
48 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639–40 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (noting that the DEA’s planned revocation policy would mean that physicians 
who spoke “candidly to their patients about the potential benefits of medical marijuana 
[would] risk losing their license to write prescriptions, which would prevent them from 
functioning as doctors”). 
49 Id. at 636. 
50 Id. at 637. 
51 Id. at 632. 
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more successful on this front.  In United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, brought one year after passage of 
the CUA, the federal government sought an injunction under the 
federal Controlled Substances Act against six different medical 
marijuana cooperatives.52  The Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative (OCBC) successfully argued before the Ninth Circuit 
that the medical necessity defense would likely apply to their 
activities.53  This time, however, the Supreme Court reversed and 
held that medical necessity was not a valid defense for the 
manufacture and distribution of marijuana because, under the 
terms of the “Controlled Substance Act, the balance already has 
been struck against a medical necessity exception.”54  As a result, 
the government was able to obtain an injunction against the 
OCBC and the other dispensaries. 
Just four years after OCBC, California’s medical marijuana 
law was back before the Supreme Court, this time in the context 
of a Commerce Clause challenge.  In 2002, DEA agents raided 
the home of Dianne Monson, a California medical marijuana 
patient, and seized six marijuana plants.  Although the 
government did not bring charges against Monson, Monson, 
along with fellow patient Angel Raich and her two caregivers, 
filed suit to enjoin the DEA from enforcing the Controlled 
Substances Act against them for cultivating medical marijuana.55  
The Raich plaintiffs relied on two recent Supreme Court 
decisions, United States v. Lopez56 and United States v. 
Morrison,57 which had restricted the federal government’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause.  In essence, Lopez and 
Morrison had held that the commerce power did not extend to 
“noncommercial” activity, placing such activity beyond the reach 
of federal law.58  Thus, for example, the Court in Lopez struck 
down a provision of the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 that 
made possession of a gun in a school zone a federal crime on the 
grounds that it was not commercial activity.59  Raich and Monson 
argued that, like possession of a gun in a school zone, the 
cultivation of marijuana for person medical use was the sort of 
52 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
53 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 
1999), rev’d, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
54 532 U.S. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
55 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7 (2005). 
56 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
57 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
58 See Alex Kreit, Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial Activity?, 28 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 169, 169–79 (2004) (describing the holdings in Lopez and 
Morrison and the interpretation of the cases prior to the decision in Raich). 
59 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68. 
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noncommercial activity that fell outside the federal government’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause. 
In a familiar procedural pattern for these cases, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled in favor of the Raich plaintiffs and, in a 6-3 
decision, the Supreme Court reversed.  The Court reasoned that 
the regulation of the possession and noncommercial cultivation of 
marijuana was a necessary part of Congress’ efforts to 
criminalize the interstate market for the drug under the 
Controlled Substances Act.  This distinguished Raich from Lopez 
and Morrison, according to the majority, because the regulation 
of the possession and cultivation for personal use of marijuana 
was an “essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, 
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated.”60 
Between them, OCBC and Raich left little doubt that federal 
officials could constitutionally prosecute medical marijuana 
growers, providers, and even patients themselves.61  And, 
throughout the past decade, the federal government 
enthusiastically exercised this authority, at least in California.62  
It has raided at least 190 medical marijuana collectives63 and 
brought criminal charges against medical marijuana growers and 
collective operators,64 many of whom were operating in strict 
compliance with California’s law.  In one high profile prosecution, 
for example, the federal government obtained a conviction 
against Charlie Lynch, who operated a medical marijuana 
collective in Morro Bay, California.  Lynch had the backing of 
town officials and even held a ribbon-cutting ceremony attended 
by the mayor and members of the city council when he opened up 
shop.65  At his sentencing, District Court Judge George H. Wu 
60 Id. at 561. 
61 On remand, Raich pressed a substantive due process-based argument before the 
Ninth Circuit, claiming that she had a fundamental right to use marijuana where it could 
be proven that it was necessary for her life or health.  This time, however, the Ninth 
Circuit held for the government. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (2007). 
For now, federal law is blind to the wisdom of a future day when the right to 
use medical marijuana to alleviate excruciating pain may be deemed 
fundamental.  Although that day has not yet dawned, considering that during 
the last ten years eleven states have legalized the use of medical marijuana, 
that day may be upon us sooner . . . . 
Id. 
62 See O’Hear, supra note 20, at 841 (noting that the federal government has only 
undertaken vigorous efforts to block state medical marijuana laws in California). 
63 MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 21, at S-1. 
64 See, e.g., Americans for Safe Access, Federal Cases, 
http://www.safeaccessnow.org/section.php?id=184 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (providing 
an overview of federal medical marijuana prosecutions). 
65 John Stossel, Andrew Sullivan & Patrick McMenamin, California Man Jailed 
for Medical Marijuana: Purveyor Charlie Lynch Gets a Year in Jail Though His Product is 
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indicated some displeasure with having to impose a one-year jail 
sentence for Lynch.  The New York Times reported that Wu 
“talked at length about what he said were Mr. Lynch’s many 
efforts to follow California’s laws on marijuana dispensaries” 
before concluding: “I find I cannot get around the one-year 
sentence[.]”66  The DEA has even gone after landlords who have 
knowingly rented their property to medical marijuana collective 
operators and growers through asset forfeiture proceedings.67 
Despite all of these efforts, however, the federal government 
has not succeeded in blocking California’s medical marijuana 
law.  By 2009, there were an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 
qualified patients under California’s medical marijuana laws.68  
Even more telling, there were over 700 medical marijuana 
collectives openly distributing the medicine via storefronts.69  The 
majority of these stores, which are organized pursuant to a 
California statute that permits patients to associate “collectively 
or cooperatively to cultivate marijuana for medical purposes,”70 
have been operating with the acceptance or even active support 
of city and county governments.  Indeed, over three dozen cities 
and counties in the state have adopted ordinances to regulate the 
zoning and land-use permitting of medical marijuana 
collectives.71  
Perhaps because it is one of the few medical marijuana 
states that has allowed a distribution system to develop,72 
California has drawn more attention from the federal 
government than most of the others.73  But, despite a dedicated 
Legal Under State Law, ABCNews.com, June 11, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Business/Stossel/Story?id=7816309&page=1. 
66 Solomon Moore, Prison Term for a Seller of Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 2009, at A18. 
67 Mikos, supra note 34, at 1467.  For a more detailed discussion of federal efforts 
to interfere with state medical marijuana laws, see Ruth C. Stern & Herbie DiFonzo, The 
End of the Red Queen’s Race: Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 673 (2009). 
68 Roger Parloff, How Medical Marijuana Became Legal, FORTUNE MAG., Sept. 18, 
2009, at 141, 144. 
69 Id. 
70 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.775 (West 2007).  See also Memorandum 
from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Cal. Att’y Gen., on Guidelines for the Security and Non-
Diversion of Marijuana Grown for Medical Use (Aug. 2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/ 
cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1601_medicalmarijuanaguidelines (providing an overview 
of guidelines for the operation of medical marijuana collectives and cooperatives). 
71 See Americans for Safe Access, Local California Dispensary Regulations, 
http://www.safeaccessnow.org/article.php?id=3165 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).  See also 
AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, MEDICAL CANNABIS DISPENSING COLLECTIVES AND LOCAL 
REGULATION 17 (2010). 
72 See Mikos, supra note 34, at 1431–32 (discussing the differences between 
different states’ medical marijuana laws). 
73 O’Hear, supra note 20, at 841 (“Except in California, it does not appear that 
medical marijuana has become a priority for federal enforcers.”). 
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and sustained effort, the federal government has been unable to 
impede California’s medical marijuana law.  Federal officials 
have been no more successful in stopping other states from 
implementing their own medical marijuana laws.74  Perhaps as a 
result, after a nearly fifteen year effort to stop state medical 
marijuana laws, the Obama Administration recently signaled a 
new course by issuing prosecutorial guidelines advising federal 
prosecutors that they “should not focus federal resources in 
[their] States on individuals whose actions are in clear and 
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for 
the medical use of marijuana,” in part because doing so “is 
unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources.”75 
As Robert Mikos explains, the federal government’s inability 
to block state medical marijuana laws results from a few 
different factors.  First, the federal government’s limited law 
enforcement resources mean that it cannot arrest and prosecute 
more than a small fraction of collective operators and growers, let 
alone patients.76  Thus, although federal law may make 
marijuana possession, cultivation, and distribution illegal for any 
and all purposes, that fact has little deterrent power in states 
with medical marijuana laws.  Unless the federal government 
was to radically increase both the federal drug control budget as 
well as the percentage of the budget devoted specifically to the 
prosecution of medical marijuana cases in states where the drug 
is legal, it can do little to change this dynamic.77  Similarly, 
Mikos argues that state laws hold greater sway over social norms 
and personal preferences than federal laws, at least in the area of 
drug policy.78  As a result, the existence of a federal ban does 
little to alter people’s personal beliefs about medical marijuana.  
Finally, the federal government is unable to resort to preemption 
to try to block state medical marijuana laws.  This is because 
74 Mikos, supra note 34, at 1481 (“Though Congress has banned marijuana 
outright through legislation that has survived constitutional scrutiny, state laws 
legalizing medical use of marijuana not only remain in effect, they now constitute the de 
facto governing law in thirteen states.”).  Interestingly, federal officials in Colorado have 
stated an affirmative lack of interest in following the approach that their colleagues in 
California have taken, indicating that enforcement in this area may have been left largely 
to the discretion of local federal officers.  Stern & DiFonzo, supra note 67, at 730. 
75 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., on Investigations 
and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf. 
76 Mikos, supra note 34, at 1463–67.  See also supra note 35 and accompanying 
text (noting that while there were 754,223 arrests for marijuana possession in the United 
States in 2008, there were only 626 federal prosecutions for marijuana possession that 
year). 
77 See O’Hear, supra note 20, at 863 (“Without local cooperation, tough federal 
policies have more bark than bite.”). 
78 Mikos, supra note 34, at 1469–79. 
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Congress does not have the authority to tell a state what activity 
to make criminal—indeed, doing so would violate the anti-
commandeering principle.79  As a result, a state’s decision to 
remove its own sanctions for medical marijuana-related activity 
cannot be preempted by the federal government.80 
B. The Collateral Consequences of Interference 
Though the federal government has not succeeded in 
preventing states from legalizing marijuana for medicinal use, its 
effort to do so has not been entirely without effect.  First, federal 
enforcement efforts have resulted in rifts between state and 
federal officials that, in at least some cases, have undermined 
existing drug enforcement partnerships focused on issues that all 
would agree are far more pressing than medical marijuana.  
Second, every federal enforcement dollar that has been put 
toward interfering with state medical marijuana laws is one less 
dollar available for other uses.  Finally, to the extent that federal 
arrests and prosecutions of individuals in compliance with state 
medical marijuana laws has had an influence on state policy, it 
has been to make the laws less controlled than they might 
otherwise be.81 
Federal interference with California’s medical marijuana law 
has needlessly strained relationships between state and federal 
law enforcement officials.  Throughout the past decade, cities 
across the state have lodged complaints with DEA offices about 
medical marijuana raids, and the California Senate even went so 
far as to vote twenty-three to fifteen in favor of a resolution 
urging the federal government to stop arresting and prosecuting 
individuals in compliance with the state’s law.82  And, in at least 
a handful of instances, local displeasure with federal actions 
went beyond strongly worded letters and resulted in concrete 
action.  In 2002, following a handful of high profile raids—
including one in which thirty DEA agents burst into a medical 
marijuana hospice with guns drawn and arrested a wheelchair-
bound patient disabled by polio—four California cities adopted 
“anti-DEA resolutions” to remove their police officers from DEA 
79 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
80 Mikos, supra note 34, at 1445–60.  See also County of San Diego v. San Diego 
NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that federal law does not 
preempt California’s medical marijuana law). 
81 Because our concern here is policy effects, this list does not include what is, of 
course, the most direct impact of the federal government’s efforts: the impact on the 
individuals who have been arrested and prosecuted. 
82 California Senate Passes Medical Marijuana Resolution, Salem-News.com, 
Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.salem-news.com/articles/september022009/cal_mj_passage_9-2-
09.php. 
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joint-task forces in protest.  San Jose Police Chief William 
Lansdowne, for example, pulled out his officers who had been 
assigned to the DEA’s High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area task 
force, saying it was “unfair to put our officers in a position of 
deciding how they’re going to enforce a law that’s in conflict with 
local law.”83  It is not surprising that state and local officials 
would respond negatively when the DEA undertakes 
investigations that are intended to obstruct state and local laws.  
Because local and federal law enforcement partner on far 
weightier problems than medical marijuana,84 damaging that 
relationship in order to conduct medical marijuana arrests and 
prosecutions is a short-sighted approach likely to do more harm 
than good. 
Along the same lines, in light of the fact that the federal 
government is unable to stop state medical marijuana laws, it is 
difficult to view its effort to do so as anything other than a waste 
of law enforcement resources.  Of course, some would argue that 
arresting and prosecuting medical marijuana patients and 
providers is a poor use of law enforcement resources under any 
circumstance.  My point here, however, is different, and should 
hold regardless of one’s personal views on the wisdom of state 
laws that permit the medical use of marijuana.  Unless the 
federal government is prepared to marshal enough resources to 
block, or at least significantly weaken, state medical marijuana 
laws, it makes little sense to engage in a scattershot series of 
raids and prosecutions.  Because medical marijuana collectives 
already operate openly and without fear of state prosecution in 
the states where they are legal, the remote possibility that they 
will face federal prosecution likely has at best an insignificant 
impact on the price of the marijuana that they dispense.  Joseph 
Russoniello, the United States Attorney for the Northern District 
of California, announced in 2008 (prior to the Obama 
Administration’s memo) that even though he was personally 
opposed to medical marijuana his office would not be targeting 
medical marijuana providers for this very reason.  “We could 
spend a lifetime closing dispensaries,” he said, but “[i]t would be 
terribly unproductive and probably not an efficient use of 
precious federal resources[.]”85  Indeed, this is also the rationale 
83 Mark Simon, San Jose Cops off DEA Squad: Chief Doesn't Want Them Raiding 
Pot Clubs, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 10, 2002, at A17.  See also Kreit, supra note 46, at 1788. 
84 It is important to note that these task forces have themselves been the subject of 
well grounded criticism. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: 
Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159 
(1995). 
85 Vic Lee, Russoniello Outlines Top Priorities, ABCNews.com (San Francisco), 
Jan. 31, 2008, http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local&id=5928173. 
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that the Obama Administration relied on in crafting its new 
policy.86 
Finally, to the extent that federal interference with state 
medical marijuana laws has created uncertainty and risk, it has 
only made the state laws harder to control and easier to abuse.  
For example, states and localities are likely to refrain from 
physically inspecting collectives to make sure they are run 
properly, or testing medical marijuana to guard against 
adulterants and provide dosage and potency information, out of 
concern that doing so would run afoul of federal law.87  Since the 
federal government is unable to stop the implementation of state 
medical marijuana laws, maintaining barriers to state controls 
only serves to make it easier for black market profiteers and 
recreational users to abuse the system. 
States and cities that have considered adopting government-
run medical marijuana programs provide an especially 
illuminating example here.  New Mexico, Maine, and San 
Francisco have all publicly discussed the idea of adopting a 
government-run medical marijuana cultivation and distribution 
model, though none of them have done so.88  In the case of Maine, 
at least, the fear that the state officials who implemented the 
program could be federally prosecuted and the potential loss of 
federal grant money was central to the decision not to adopt a 
state-run system.89  While a state-run medical marijuana 
program might be a tough pill for medical marijuana opponents 
to swallow, it would seem to be preferable to the alternative 
system of privately run collectives.  A state-run system would be 
much more closely supervised and monitored than a private 
system.  It could provide certainty that the medical marijuana 
used in the program was grown by state officials and was not 
lining the pockets of black-market producers.  A state-run system 
would also likely be much more effective at guarding against 
diversion of marijuana to recreational users.  Though medical 
marijuana opponents would surely prefer not to have medical 
marijuana collectives at all, in light of the federal government’s 
inability to stop the implementation of state medical marijuana 
laws, that does not appear to be an option.  And, if the choice is 
between a state-run system or a private system, a state-run 
86  Memorandum from David W. Ogden, supra note 75. 
87 For example, most jurisdictions hold that holding a controlled substance in one’s 
hand, even for a brief moment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession. See, e.g., 
Hawaii v. Hogue, 486 P.2d 403, 406 (1971). 
88 Mikos, supra note 34, at 1432 n.46 and accompanying text. 
89 Id. at 1459 n.135. 
Do Not Delete 8/31/2010 9:44 PM 
2010] Beyond the Prohibition Debate 575 
system would appear to be far better from the perspective of 
those who favor the strictest possible control.90 
In sum, the federal effort to block state medical marijuana 
laws has strained relationships between state and federal 
officials, drained federal drug enforcement resources from other 
priorities, and made it more difficult for state and local 
governments to strictly control medical marijuana operations.  If 
the federal government is unable to stop or seriously disrupt 
state medical marijuana programs, opponents of medical 
marijuana should want to incentivize states to enact stricter 
controls.  A system of minimal enforcement, however, produces 
the opposite result.  Absent a Machiavellian hope that poorly 
regulated state medical marijuana laws will make them less 
appealing and result in their repeal, it is difficult to see the 
benefit of putting roadblocks in the way of strict state regulation, 
particularly from the prohibitionist perspective. 
I want to emphasize that my chief goal here is not to 
persuade the reader that the federal government should not 
interfere with state medical marijuana laws per se.  This 
discussion is meant to demonstrate why, when thinking about 
federal responses to state reforms, we must be careful not to view 
federal drug law as a simple referendum on the state’s law.  
Reducing the problem of how federal law should approach state 
medical marijuana laws to whether or not one personally 
supports medical marijuana only makes sense if the federal 
government is able to block the state laws.  And, as the federal 
response to medical marijuana shows us, the federal government 
may actually have very little ability to prevent states from 
implementing laws that are at-odds with federal policy. 
IV.  THE WAY FORWARD:  FOCUS ON CONTROLLING, NOT 
BLOCKING, STATE POLICY INNOVATIONS 
Up until this point, this article has focused primarily on 
advancing the argument that debates about whether to legalize 
marijuana or allow the use of medical marijuana do not reflect 
the considerations that should guide decisions about federal drug 
laws.  This is because the federal government does not have the 
resources or ability to control state policy when it comes to drug 
90 Similarly, while the threat of federal prosecution is too improbable to keep 
medical marijuana dispensaries from operating openly in storefronts throughout 
California, it may be sufficiently strong to dissuade some risk-averse and law-abiding 
people from operating a collective, thereby leaving room for risk-seeking individuals to 
step in.  Of course, this may be counter-balanced by the fact that the collective operators 
themselves may be patients who are willing to risk prosecution based on their belief in 
the cause of medical marijuana. 
Do Not Delete 8/31/2010 9:44 PM 
576 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:555
laws.  This is true both for proposals to ease the drug laws, such 
as Barney Frank’s decriminalization bill, and for efforts to block 
states from reforming their own laws, like the federal effort to 
undermine California’s medical marijuana law.  In this section, I 
will briefly explore what this insight might mean for how the 
federal government should approach drug enforcement, and in 
particular, respond to state reforms.  I will argue that the 
dynamic discussed above counsels in favor of enacting federal 
laws that respect states’ autonomy to enact their own drug 
laws—even where state laws conflict with federal preferences—
but also provide important controls and incentives to prevent 
against negative externalities in the form of spillover effects in 
neighboring states.  This outlook is similar to the “competitive 
alternative” model advanced by Michael O’Hear in Federalism 
and Drug Control.91  The insights above, however, provide even 
greater support for such a model, particularly for those who may 
be opposed to state reforms on their own merits. 
As an initial matter, even if we were to put the limitations of 
federal power in this area aside, the results of the last four 
decades weigh strongly in favor of encouraging states to innovate 
and try new approaches.  With more teens reporting that it is 
easier for them to buy marijuana than alcohol92 and nearly three 
times as many American teens having tried the drug than in the 
Netherlands where it is openly bought and sold, there is every 
reason to believe that we could be achieving the same, and likely 
better, results than we are now, at a lower human and financial 
cost.  While this much seems clear, opinions vary widely as to 
exactly what the best alternative might be.93  Accordingly, 
allowing for the maximum possible amount of local and state 
innovation and diversity in the field of drug laws would better 
enable us to explore various policy alternatives in the service of 
achieving a more rational and cost-effective set of drug policies.94  
After all, with seventy-five percent of Americans in agreement 
91 O’Hear supra note 20, at 873–81 (proposing a “competitive alternative” model of 
federal and state interaction in the area of drug enforcement). 
92 NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE XIII: TEENS AND PARENTS 17 Fig.3.P, 
available at http://www.casacolumbia.org/ articlefiles/380-2008%20Teen%20Survey% 
20Report.pdf (showing that twenty-three percent of teens say marijuana is the easiest 
drug for them to buy, while only fifteen percent say beer is the easiest). 
93 See, e.g., O’Hear, supra note 20, at 873 (“Given this diversity of options and the 
localized nature of the harms flowing from drug use, there seems to be little reason to 
deny different communities the opportunity to select their own policy responses.”). 
94 Id. (“Decentralized policymaking . . . carries the ancillary benefit of promoting 
the sort of policy innovation and real-world testing that may contribute to resolving some 
of the longstanding theoretical and empirical disputes in the field.”). 
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that the war on drugs strategy has failed,95 and a wide range of 
policy options for reform, drug policy would appear to be a 
particularly appropriate area for maximizing the benefits of our 
federal system. 
Even for those who would prefer not to allow states to enact 
reforms such as legalizing medical marijuana, however, there is 
much to be said in favor of a decentralized approach.  This is 
because the experience of state medical marijuana laws reveals 
that the federal government simply may not be able to prevent 
states from implementing drug laws that are at-odds with federal 
policy.  By coming to terms with the limits of its authority, the 
federal government could actually achieve greater influence over 
state reforms than it has now.96  For example, instead of 
preventing states from directly cultivating and distributing 
medical marijuana as federal law does now,97 federal elected 
officials might consider providing an incentive for states that 
implement medical marijuana laws to make them state-run.  
This change could be easily achieved by expanding a provision of 
the Controlled Substances Act that grants immunity to state and 
local officials who are “lawfully engaged in the enforcement of 
any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled 
substances.”98  Courts have interpreted the provision to grant 
immunity from federal prosecution to officers who violate the 
drug laws while working undercover, but not to officials who are 
engaged in the implementation of state and local medical 
marijuana laws.99  If the provision were extended, however, to 
explicitly include state and local government officials 
implementing their own laws, even where they otherwise conflict 
with federal law, then states and localities that enact reforms 
would have a strong incentive to adopt a government-run model.  
This would likely result in reforms that are more limited and 
strictly controlled than those arising in a private system.  As a 
result, state reforms would be better controlled and less likely to 
95 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
96 For a discussion of the potential for state reforms to result in spillover effects in 
neighboring states, see O’Hear, supra note 20, at 868–72. 
97 See Mikos, supra note 34, at 1458 (discussing this aspect of federal law). 
98 For a discussion of the current interpretation of this provision, see id. at 1457–
59. 
99 See, e.g., id.; United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that an Oakland immunity statute could not shield a defendant from prosecution 
for ensuring legal distribution of marijuana).  For an argument that the plain language of 
the provision as-written should provide immunity to individuals engaged in implementing 
medical marijuana laws, see, for example, Reply Brief of Appellant at 2–6, United States 
v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 259 Fed. App’x 936 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-16466) 
(arguing that the plain meaning of “enforce” extends beyond compelling compliance with a 
law and includes giving effect to a law). 
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result in spillover effects in neighboring states.  Similarly, the 
federal government might consider adopting a policy permitting 
state and local governments to implement laws that are at odds 
with the federal prohibitionist preference if they pay a fee from 
their revenues to a fund that would help defray such spillover 
costs.  One can easily imagine a range of other possible changes 
to federal law along these lines, and my aim here is not to 
advocate for any one proposal specifically.  Instead, my claim is 
that by abandoning a futile effort to stop states from 
implementing their own reforms entirely, the federal government 
could enact policies that might result in more constrained and 
limited state reforms. 
To be sure, this approach would not fully satisfy those who 
think that the federal government should dictate state policy or 
who believe the federal government has a moral imperative to 
maintain a strict prohibitionist approach regardless of its actual 
impact.  But I would urge those who find these ideas hard to 
stomach to give serious consideration to whether it would be 
wise, or even feasible, for the federal government to devote the 
amount of resources that would be necessary to have even a 
realistic chance of actually blocking state reforms.  The 
experience to date with state medical marijuana laws indicates 
that the federal government would need to expend significant 
amounts of money and law enforcement energy to have even a 
remote chance of preventing the implementation of state reforms.  
If a state sought to legalize, say, methamphetamine, then 
perhaps the argument for marshalling the necessary resources 
would be compelling.  But, when it comes to medical marijuana, 
or even state proposals to legalize marijuana outright, it seems 
much more difficult to justify the costs that would be required for 
the federal government to have even a remote chance of blocking 
the state reform. 
To state the issue somewhat differently, once a state has 
enacted a law legalizing medical marijuana, the law’s opponents 
have nothing but second-best options.  Short of repealing the 
state’s law, the only recourse for the law’s opponents is federal 
law.  But at this stage, the calculus is much more complex than 
whether or not one agrees with the state’s law on its own terms.  
If the federal government is capable of blocking implementation 
of the state’s law, then opponents of the law should naturally and 
logically see that as the best strategy.  But what if the federal 
government is simply unable to block or even to significantly 
interfere with the state’s law?  Would opponents of the law be 
better served by a haphazard series of federal prosecutions, or by 
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changing federal law to explicitly permit the state reform but 
strictly control it? 
These are the sorts of questions that federal drug policy will 
need to address in era of state reform.  To date, however, this 
nuanced view of federal drug law has been almost completely 
overlooked in favor of a stale and increasingly irrelevant debate.  
On a related note, the dynamics of state reform also weigh in 
favor of a broader re-examination of the federal role in drug 
enforcement, with an eye toward targeting specialized federal 
resources in areas where they can have the greatest impact.  
Arguably, many federal trafficking prosecutions today do not fall 
into the category of offenses that truly require federal attention.  
A 2007 U.S. Sentencing Commission report, for example, found 
that 61.5 percent of crack offenders and 53.1 percent of powder 
cocaine offenders could be classified as low or mid-level 
offenders—such as couriers, street dealers, or lookouts.100  These 
numbers raise serious questions about the current allocation of 
federal resources in drug enforcement.  Even assuming that 
going after lookouts and other street level offenders is an efficient 
use of federal dollars, however, it is very difficult to formulate a 
good justification for the federal government to concern itself 
with the simple possession of personal-use amounts of a 
controlled substance.  Indeed, the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy has made it a point to emphasize that the federal 
government rarely targets drug users, especially marijuana 
users.101  Statistics that indicate only about 1,000 drug 
possession cases were disposed of at the federal level in 2008 
confirm that the federal government is simply not well positioned 
to directly respond to such a localized problem.  Since that is the 
case, there is a strong argument for doing away with federal laws 
against simple possession of small quantities for all drugs, not 
because drug decriminalization is necessarily a better policy than 
prohibition, but because there is little upside and much potential 
downside to having a federal law that is so rarely enforced and 
duplicative of state and local efforts.  Doing so would have the 
added benefit of allowing states to implement reforms in areas 
that might involve simple possession—such as state medical 
marijuana laws—outside of the shadow of conflicting federal law. 
100 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 19 Fig. 
2-4 (2007).  Similarly, a 1994 Department of Justice report found that 36.1 percent of all 
federal drug offenders were “low-level” offenders under the Department’s own criteria and 
that these offenders received an average prison sentence of 85.1 months.  The 1994 report 
did not include mid-level offenders. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF NON-VIOLENT 
DRUG OFFENDERS WITH MINIMAL CRIMINAL HISTORIES 2–3 (1994). 
101 See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 36 and accompanying 
text. 
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This brief discussion is intended only as an overview of the 
types of reforms that the federal government might examine in 
an environment where states are adopting laws that are at-odds 
with federal preferences.  These are, of course, only a few of the 
many possible options that the federal government might 
consider implementing.102  My purpose here is not to endorse one 
specific proposal or another, but to argue that, as states adopt 
new drug policies, and as support for alternatives to the drug war 
strategy increases at the federal level, the federal government 
should carefully consider the merits of policies that respect state 
policy choices but also provide incentives for states to closely 
regulate and control any reforms they might enact. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay considers the question of how to think about 
federal drug laws in a post-drug war era—one in which states are 
enacting reforms that are at odds with stated federal policy.  My 
approach here has been, by design, limited and focused.  I have, 
for example, omitted some of the most important proposals for 
reforming federal drug laws, such as reforms that would reduce 
the severity of federal sentences for low-level drug offenders.  
Instead, this essay seeks to examine possible reforms that relate 
to the role of federal law in shaping and enforcing our drug 
policies. 
The discussion reveals the importance of cutting through the 
debate about prohibition and legalization when thinking about 
federal drug laws.  By looking at a proposal in Congress to 
“decriminalize” marijuana, we find that the federal government 
could not unilaterally legalize or decriminalize a drug even if it 
wanted to.  As a practical matter, if the federal government were 
to remove federal penalties for possession of small amounts of 
marijuana, the result would not be nationwide decriminalization 
but a shift in at most 600-odd defendants from federal to state 
courts.  This is in large part because, even in an age of 
unprecedented federal involvement in criminal law enforcement, 
states still arrest and prosecute far more offenders than the 
federal government.  For this same reason, the federal 
government may be unable to stop states from enacting reforms 
like the legalization of medical marijuana, even though they are 
inconsistent with federal policy. 
102 For some additional proposals along these lines, see O’Hear, supra note 20, at 
873–81. 
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The federal government cannot legalize marijuana on its 
own, but it also cannot stop a state from doing so.103  As a result, 
if we approach proposals to reform federal drug laws from the 
prohibition/legalization framework, we will be asking the wrong 
questions.  Instead, we would be much better served by thinking 
about these issues in terms of the role of federal government in 
light of state laws.  This is not only a more accurate way to look 
at issues like how the federal government should respond to state 
medical marijuana laws, but it also has the potential to help 
begin to bridge the divide in what is often a polarizing debate. 
103 See O’Hear, supra note 34, at 788 (“Rather than acting as a dictator of state 
policy, the federal government exercises, at most, a loose control over the general 
direction taken by lower levels of government.”). 
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